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Comments I
Done with Distracted Driving: Implications
of Pennsylvania's Ban on Text-Based




In an era characterized by prolific use of cellular phones with ever-
expanding capabilities, liberty and privacy ideals often compete with
public safety interests. Rising levels of injuries and fatalities from
collisions attributed to cell phone use while driving have motivated
Pennsylvania lawmakers to ban text-based communication while an
individual is operating a vehicle. Roadway safety is a legitimate and
important governmental objective; however, the innumerable functions
capable of being performed by a modem cell phone and the enormity of
information able to be stored on such a device necessitates a policy
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friends Mary, Sara, and Whitney, for their ongoing love and support. I also extend
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consistent with Pennsylvania's historic dedication to the privacy rights of
its residents.
This Comment provides an overview of the problem of cell phone
use while driving and discusses the primary elements of Pennsylvania's
prohibition of text messaging while driving. In addition, the Comment
examines Pennsylvania search and seizure law under article I, section 8
of the state constitution as it is applicable to scenarios that are likely to
arise in the enforcement of Pennsylvania's ban on text-based
communication during vehicle operation. The analysis reveals concerns
regarding the enforcement of Pennsylvania's distracted driving
legislation and highlights issues concerning the privacy implications
inherent in cell phone searches. Lastly, this Comment seeks to provide
solutions consistent with Pennsylvania case law to balance personal
privacy and public safety.
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I. INTRODUCTION
May 18, 2008 was college graduation day for Jacy Good.' A day
that the Goods intended to be memorable quickly turned painfully
unforgettable for Jacy. 2  She and her parents had attended the
commencement ceremony at Muhlenberg College in Allentown,
Pennsylvania, and were returning home when a tractor trailer slammed
into the Goods' vehicle.3 The driver of the tractor trailer swerved to miss
a car whose driver sped through a red light while talking on his cell
phone. Jacy's parents were killed instantly.5
After defying her doctors' expectations and living past the first 36
hours after the accident, Jacy began a long physical and emotional
recovery process during which she had to re-learn basic skills while
coping with the grief of losing her parents.6 Although she has made
great progress, Jacy can no longer participate in her favorite athletic
activities and wonders who will walk her down the aisle at her wedding.
7
Jacy's traumatic experience led her to become a spokesperson for a
campaign to end distracted driving.
8
For Jacy Good, as well as many others in Pennsylvania and the
United States, the fight against the alarming trend of distracted driving
has become a personal crusade. Although citizens and lawmakers are
often divided as to the best approach to modify drivers' behavior,9 these
stories of preventable tragedies have created a strong impetus for change.
1. Faces of Distracted Driving: Jacy Good "I never want anyone to go through
what I've been through," FAST LANE: THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF






6. Faces of Distracted Driving, supra note 1.
7. Id. Because of the severity of her injuries, Jacy's progress has surprised her
doctors; however, she lacks function in one of her arms and walks with the assistance of a
cane. Say Yes to the Dress: Bride lacy Good Talks About Her Tragic Accident,
HUFFPOST WEDDINGS (Dec. 16, 2011, 7:50 PM), http://huff.to/MTrLGY. Jacy will marry
her longtime boyfriend in October 2012, and recently appeared on television in TLC's
"Say Yes to the Dress." See id; see also Say Yes to the Dress (TLC television broadcast
Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://bit.ly/NdgWur.
8. See Faces of Distracted Driving, supra note 1.
9. See generally DISTRACTED DRIVING SAFETY ALLIANCE, http://bit.lyfMmljlB
(collecting various articles on possible methods of addressing the problem of distracted
driving). See also Safety Culture: Heads Up Driving Week-Fact Sheet, AAA FOUND.
FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY (Oct. 2-8, 2011), http://bit.ly/s4oTwZ [hereinafter Fact Sheet]
("87% of drivers expressed support for having a law against reading, typing, or sending a
text message or email while driving; 70% of drivers support having a law against using a
hand-held cell phone while driving for all drivers regardless of age; 50% of drivers
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Recently, a number of studies have emphasized the danger of cell
phone use while driving and have created an additional catalyst for
change in the movement against distracted driving. 10 The mounting
evidence on the topic indicates that cell phone use behind the wheel,
particularly text messaging, or "driving while intexticated,"" should be a
major concern for those who advocate safety on the road. 12 For instance,
a recent study reveals that texting while driving doubles a driver's
reaction time. 13  Research also indicates that text messaging while
driving is at least as dangerous as driving under the influence of
alcohol.14 Additionally, the National Safety Council estimates that at
least 23 percent of all traffic collisions involve one or more drivers using
a cell phone moments before impact.' 
5
Despite increased public awareness of these risks, many individuals
continue to use a cell phone while driving. This behavior persists even
though both empirical data 16 and surveys of drivers 7 indicate the
magnitude of the distracted driving problem. For instance, within a one
month period, 35 percent of drivers have sent or read a text message or e-
mail while on the road.' 8 Similarly, 67 percent of drivers admitted to
support having a law against using any type of cell phone while driving, hand-held or
hands-free, for all drivers regardless of age.").
10. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
11. See Jenny Brundin, High-Tech Solutions to Help Deter Driver Texting, NPR
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://n.pr/HuwGm.
12. See, e.g., Jim Forsyth, Texting, or Emailing, While Driving Doubles Reaction
Time and Makes Drivers More Likely to Miss a Flashing Light, According to New
Research, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2011, 5:07 AM), http://reut.rs/NeKR5d.
13. Id. In a study by Texas A&M University's Texas Transportation Institute,
researchers found that non-distracted drivers stopping in response to a flashing yellow
light on a test course had a reaction time of about one to two seconds. Id. In contrast,
drivers who were either reading or writing a text message had a reaction time of three to
four seconds. Id. Additionally, the study found that a texting driver was 11 times more
likely to miss the flashing light completely. Id. One of the leaders of the study
emphasized that "the three to four second lag time is significant because at highway
speeds a driver can travel the length of a football field in that time." Id.
14. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., TRAFFIC CODE § 12-1132(1)(e)(.2) (2011). Legislative
findings accompanying the Philadelphia ordinance indicate that "[d]rivers operating
motor vehicles while using a mobile phone are as impaired as drivers with a 0.08 percent
blood alcohol level-the level that defines drunk driving in most states." Id.; see also
Phil LeBeau, Texting and Driving Worse than Drinking and Driving, CNBC (June 25,
2009), http://bit.ly/ayo9rP.
15. Press Release, Nat'l Safety Council, National Safety Council Estimates that at
Least 1.6 Million Crashes Each Year Involve Drivers Using Cell Phones and Texting
(Jan. 10, 2010) (updated in 2011), available at http://bit.ly/923bY8.
16. See Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
17. See id. ("95% of drivers said they consider other drivers text messaging or
emailing while driving to be a serious threat to their personal safety and 94% said they
consider texting or emailing while driving to be unacceptable.").
18. Id.
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having talked on a hand-held cell phone while driving within the same
month period and many admitted to doing so regularly.19 Although most
drivers are aware of the inherent dangers of driving while distracted, a
large number continue the practice of using cell phones on the road.20
Recognizing the significant dangers of drivers using cell phones for
voice communication and texting purposes, a growing number of
jurisdictions have sought to promote safety on the road by enacting laws
21that proscribe this behavior in some manner. Currently, 39 states have
prohibited texting while driving, and 10 states and the District of
Columbia have also banned any use of hand-held phones while operating
a vehicle.22 The U.S. Department of Transportation also recognized the
problem when it prohibited commercial drivers, such as truck and bus
drivers, from texting while driving.23  Moreover, President Barack
Obama issued an executive order that banned all federal employees from
texting while either driving a government-owned vehicle or driving in
the course of their employment.24
Because individuals who acknowledge the dangers of using cell
25phones while driving often continue this behavior, many citizens and
lawmakers believe government sanctions are the most effective means of
limiting this conduct.26 Sanctions have typically taken the form of
fines; 27 however, even where the punishment is minimal, a significant
danger exists that laws limiting the use of cell phones while driving
invade the privacy interests of citizens.28
19. Id. (stating that 31% of drivers surveyed said that they frequently talked on their
cell phone while driving).
20. See id.
21. See State Laws on Distracted Driving, DISTRACTION.GOV, http://bit.ly/vlc20p
(giving overview of state laws). For a more recent overview, see Cell Phone and Texting
Laws, GOVERNORs HIGHWAY SAFETY Ass'N (July 2012), http://bit.ly/MhTvPD.
22. Cell phone and texting laws, supra note 21. The following states prohibit adults
from using hand-held cell phones while operating a vehicle: California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington, and West
Virginia. Id. Far more states have taken a more hesitant approach by only banning text-
messaging while driving. Id. Those states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Other states have banned cell phone use within
certain highway zones or by particular age groups. Id. Additionally, some states have
enacted broad distracted driving provisions that encompass cell phone use. Id.
23. See 49 C.F.R. § 392.80 (2010).
24. See Exec. Order No. 13513, 70 Fed. Reg. 51225 (Oct. 1, 2009).
25. See Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
26. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
27. See generally Cell Phone and Texting Laws, supra note 21 (providing a monthly
update and overview of state laws related to cell phone use while driving).
28. See infra Part Il1.
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Pennsylvania recently 29 became the 35th state in the United States
to enact a ban on text messaging while driving. 30 Before the passage of
title 75, section 3316 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code,3' state
lawmakers had struggled for years to create a distracted driving law
pertaining to cell phone use.32 Disputes over whether enforcement
should be primary or secondary 33 and whether talking and texting should
both be banned led to gridlock in the General Assembly.34 Failure to
pass a state law caused several cities and townships across the state to
enact municipal bans on distracted driving.35  However, issues of
preemption by state law and conflicts with provisions of the
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code raised questions over whether these
ordinances were enforceable.36 In addition, due process concerns and
other constitutional issues made these laws susceptible to challenges by
citizens who received citations.37
In reaction to the legal issues created by the municipal bans, many
citizens urged the General Assembly to enact a statewide ban on
distracted driving.38 The Pennsylvania General Assembly responded by
passing a statewide prohibition on "text-based communication," making
driving while texting a summary offense 39 subject to primary
enforcement.40 Significantly, however, Pennsylvania's law does not
prohibit receiving or placing a phone call, nor does it proscribe engaging
in cell phone "voice communication" while driving.4'
29. Governor Tom Corbett signed the ban into law on November 9, 2011. See Mark
Shade, Pennsylvania Joins States with Texting-While-Driving Bans, REUTERS (Nov. 9,
2011,2:02 PM), http://reut.rs/QLeboO.
30. See id
31. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316 (Supp. 2012),
32. See Pennsylvania: Cell Phone Laws, Legislation, HANDS-FREE INFO (Nov. 9,
2011), http://bit.ly/SaeBt [hereinafter HANDS-FREE INFO].
33. Primary enforcement means that officers can pull over a driver solely for
violating the text messaging ban while secondary enforcement involves citing a driver for
the distracted driving offense after stopping the vehicle for violating another provision of
the Vehicle Code. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. (stating that Philadelphia, Harrisburg, Erie, Wilkes-Barre, and Allentown,
among others, have enacted such laws); see also infra note 42.
36. See, e.g., HANDS-FREE INFO, supra note 32.
37. See Matthew Harris, Wilkes-Barre Posts Signs Warning Motorists of Cell Phone
Law, CITIZENS VOICE (May 22, 2010), http://bit.ly/M9716j (reporting on signs telling
drivers of a city ordinance banning cell phone use while driving and quoting Wilkes-
Barre City Attorney Tim Henry as saying that "[t]he intent is to put the public on
notice.... Notice in a legal hearing is the same as due process protection").
38. See id
39. A summary offense is "an offense ... that can be prosecuted without an
indictment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (8th ed. 2004).
40. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316 (Supp. 2012).
41. See id. § 3316(a).
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This Comment will clarify the law in Pennsylvania relating to cell
phone use while driving and will describe concerns that arise from
enforcing the state's recent prohibition of text messaging behind the
wheel. Part II will recount the efforts of Pennsylvania lawmakers to
address distracted driving in the context of cell phones and will outline
the details of the newly enacted texting ban. Part II will also discuss the
history of the state constitutional provision that governs search and
seizure and will give a framework of case law interpreting relevant rights
under that section. Part III will highlight foreseeable problems in
enforcing section 3316 and its ramifications on the privacy interests of
citizens. Specifically, Part III will focus on the level of suspicion an
officer must have to stop a driver and the possibility of cell phone
searches incident to arrest arising under section 3316. After an analysis
of possible difficulties in enforcing the provision, Part III will suggest
potential resolutions within the framework of Pennsylvania search and
seizure precedent. Finally, Part IV will reiterate the importance of
striking the appropriate balance between the safety and privacy interests
of Pennsylvania citizens relating to the issue of cell phone use while
driving.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pennsylvania's Distracted Driving History
Before the enactment of a statewide ban, governing bodies in
several Pennsylvania municipalities enacted distracted driving
ordinances that banned the use of cell phones while driving.a2 These
jurisdictions recognized that drivers distracted by wireless devices are
more likely to cause accidents. a3 Although safety on municipal roadways
has been and remains a legitimate state interest, municipalities
encountered several impediments to enforcing the ordinances.44
First, Pennsylvania's Vehicle Code requires traffic laws to be
uniform across the state.45 For this reason, a Court of Common Pleas
42. See, e.g., WILKES-BARRE, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 29-7 (Supp. 2010);
PHILADELPHIA, PA., TRAFFIC CODE § 12-1132 (2011) (approved April 29, 2009); ERIE, PA,
ORDINANCE no. 19-2010 (2010) (amending a previous ordinance enacted in 2009).
43. See supra Part I; see also PHILADELPHIA, PA., TRAFFIC CODE § 12-1132(1)
(2011). The Philadelphia ordinance includes legislative findings that enumerate various
statistics on the danger of cell phone use while driving. Id.
44. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text (describing preemption and due
process issues concerning enforcement of bans on cell phone use while driving).
45. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101 (2006) ("The provisions of this title shall be
applicable and uniform throughout this Commonwealth and in all political subdivisions
in this Commonwealth, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on a
matter covered by the provisions of this title unless expressly authorized.").
20121
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Judge invalidated Allentown, Pennsylvania's distracted driving law on
the grounds that state law preempted it.46  Additionally, because of
preemption concerns, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,
acting pursuant to its statutory authority, prohibited municipalities from
posting signs on local state-funded roads to notify drivers of distracted
driving bans.47 As a result, some drivers in jurisdictions with distracted
driving ordinances may not have been on notice of the ban, possibly
raising due process issues.
48
Such concerns, as well Pennsylvania's nearly 1,100 automobile
collisions involving "hand[-]held cellular phone[s]" in 2010, were the
impetus for the General Assembly's recent ban on text messaging while
driving.49 After multiple revisions in both the Pennsylvania Senate and
the House of Representatives, section 3316 bans only text messaging
while driving and does not ban engaging in phone conversations while
driving.5° The legislation prohibits a driver from using an "interactive
wireless communications device"51 to "send, read or write a text-based
communication 52 while the vehicle is in motion.,
53
Additionally, the new law mandates primary enforcement for
texting while driving.54  A violation of the prohibition is a summary
46. Allentown Cell Phone Law Tossed, HANDS-FREE INFo (June 8, 2011),
http://bit.ly/ilfHiKB (discussing how officials in Allentown decided to stop enforcing the
ban and not appeal the ruling, hoping that the Pennsylvania General Assembly would
pass a statewide ban).
47. See supra note 37. See generally 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6122 (2006).
48. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 37. To protect against due process challenges to
Wilkes-Barre's texting and driving law, lawmakers designated a three-month period to
notify the public of its existence before the ordinance took effect. Id.
49. See Shade, supra note 29; Press Release, Pa. Office of the Governor, Governor
Corbett Signs Ban on Texting While Driving in Pa. (Nov. 9, 2011), available at
http://bit.ly/aBuhyH ("Senate Bill 314 aims to put a halt to texting from behind the wheel
and is intended to save lives .... In 2010, there were almost 14,000 crashes in
Pennsylvania where distracted driving played a role, with nearly 1,100 of those crashes
involving a hand-held cellular phone.").
50. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(a)(Supp. 2012).
51. Id. An interactive wireless communications device is defined as "a wireless
telephone, personal digital assistant, smart phone, portable or mobile computer or similar
device which can be used for voice communication, texting, e-mailing, browsing the
intemet or instant messaging." Id. However, it does not include a GPS, a system that is
integrated into the vehicle, or "a communications device that is affixed to a mass transit
vehicle, bus or school bus." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
52. Id. § 3316(f) (defining "text-based communication" as a "text message, instant
message, electronic mail or other written communication composed or received on an
interactive wireless communications device").
53. Id.
54. See id. § 3316. The Pennsylvania statute also provides for a fine of up to $100,
which doubles in school and construction zones. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(d) (Supp.
2012). See supra note 39 for the definition of summary offense.
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offense subject to a $50 fine.55 The statewide ban on texting and driving
also expressly preempts "all ordinances of any municipality" relating to
"use of an interactive wireless communications device" 56 by drivers in
accord with the state's requirement of uniformity of traffic codes.
57
Moreover, section 3316 articulates that the new law "shall not be
construed as authorizing the seizure or forfeiture of an interactive
wireless communications device, unless otherwise provided by law. 58
The legislation took effect on March 8, 2012.59
B. Text and History ofArticle I, Section 8
A basic tenet of federalism in the United States is that states are free
to interpret provisions of their constitutions independently of the United
States Constitution.6 ° Consistent with its statement that "each state has
the power to provide broader standards, and go beyond the minimum
floor which is established by the federal Constitution," 61 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has interpreted the Pennsylvania State
Constitution to reserve more individual liberties for its citizens in some
circumstances than the Supreme Court of the United States.62 In no area
of its state constitutional jurisprudence has the court been more
protective of the rights of its citizens than in the domain of search and
seizure.
63
Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is the
counterpart to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
as both provisions govern security from search and seizure. 64 Article I,
section 8 provides:
55. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(d) (Supp. 2012).
56. Id. § 3316(e).
57. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101 (2006); see also supra note 45 for the language
of the prohibition.
58. Id. § 3316(c).
59. Id. § 3316.
60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991) ("[I]n
interpreting a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we are not bound by the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret similar (yet distinct) federal
constitutional provisions.").
61. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894 (citing Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 467
(Pa. 1983)).
62. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995) ("It is
axiomatic that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may provide more protection for the
citizens of Pennsylvania under the Pennsylvania Constitution than the federal courts
provide under the United States Constitution.").
63. For an overview of search and seizure in Pennsylvania, see DAVID RUDOVSKY,
THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE IN PENNSYLVANIA (6th ed. 2011).
64. PA. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant
to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue
without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
65
Adopted in 1776, this provision predates the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution; in fact, the framers of the United States
Constitution looked to article I, section 8 in creating its federal
counterpart.66 Although a version of this provision has been present in
the Pennsylvania Constitution for over 200 years, Pennsylvania courts
did not broadly interpret article I, section 8 until the criminal procedure
jurisprudence of the 1960s and the application of the exclusionary rule to
states in Mapp v. Ohio.67 In broadly interpreting its own provision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court began to carefully scrutinize decisions of
the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
68
In fact, analyzing state constitutional protections separately from
federal interpretation has been a fairly recent phenomenon following a
period in which independent inquiry was not common.69  Renewed
interest in state constitutional interpretation has created a distinct body of
criminal procedure guidelines in Pennsylvania. 70  In response to this
developing body of precedent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Edmunds71 articulated a framework for courts to
follow when determining whether a provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution should grant greater constitutional protection than the
65. PA. CONST. art. I, § 8. The language of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution is similar:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66. See David Rudovsky, Searches and Seizures, in THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 301 (Ken Gormley et al. eds.,
2004); see also Commonwealth v. Parker, 619 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
67. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Rudovsky, supra note 66, at 302.
68. See id.
69. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991) ("The past two
decades have witnessed a strong resurgence of independent state constitutional analysis,
in Pennsylvania and elsewhere."). This trend of renewed interest in state constitutional
analysis separate from the federal Constitution has been termed "New Federalism." Id.
70. See, e.g., id. ("The past two decades have witnessed a strong resurgence of
independent state constitutional analysis, in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.").
71. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991).
[Vol. 117:1
DONE WITH DISTRACTED DRIVING
federal Constitution.72 The Edmunds test encourages parties and courts
to analyze: (1) the text of article I, section 8; (2) the history and case law
interpreting article I, section 8; (3) related case law from other states; and
(4) policy considerations.73
C. Relevant Case Law Interpreting Rights Under Article , Section 8
Following the framework set forth in Edmunds, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has frequently articulated that article I, section 8 gives
citizens greater protection from government search and seizure than the
Federal Constitution because the Pennsylvania provision is grounded in
the privacy rights of citizens. 74  Conversely, the trend in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is to focus on the goal of deterring police
misconduct. 75 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that article I,
section 8 is more protective of citizens' privacy interests than the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in a variety of contexts.76
Several important cases decided by Pennsylvania appellate courts
establish a framework of search and seizure rights that are relevant in
72. Id. Notably, the court decided Edmunds in the context of search and seizure
under article I, section 8, though it applies to all provisions of the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights. See Rudovsky, supra note 66, at 301.
73. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894.
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995).
75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473 (Pa. 1991); cf New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (stating that the "justification" for a search incident to
arrest of a container found in the passenger compartment of an automobile "is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest
justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have").
76. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999) (holding that when a
misdemeanor is not committed in the presence of officers, warrantless arrest is
unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 773 (Pa. 1996) (holding that,
unlike the United States Supreme Court's holding in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621 (1991), an officer who pursues an individual without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion seizes that person for purposes of article I, section 8 and stating that
Pennsylvania "has always maintained a strong preference for the rights of the individual
in the face of coercive state action"); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995)
(holding that vehicle searches incident to arrest are only permissible in Pennsylvania
when obtaining a warrant would be dangerous to police officers or when there is a risk of
destruction of evidence); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (holding
that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule-established by United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)-is not a part of article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983) (rejecting the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and
safeguarding broad standing rights relating to an individual's expectation of privacy);
Commonwealth v. Dejohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979) (holding that individuals have
privacy expectations and interests in their bank records).
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In Commonwealth v. Chase,78 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
undertook a federal and state constitutional analysis of a Pennsylvania
statute.79 The General Assembly had recently changed the provision to
articulate reasonable suspicion" as the standard police officers must use
to determine if they have cause to stop a driver for violating a provision
of the Vehicle Code. 81 After applying the Edmunds test 82 to determine if
article I, section 8 provided broader constitutional protections than the
Fourth Amendment, the court found that the Pennsylvania Constitution,
like the Fourth Amendment, does not require an officer to possess
probable cause 83 to effectuate an investigative detention of a vehicle.
84
77. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v.
Clark, 735 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d
457 (Pa. 1983).
78. Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008).
79. The relevant statute states:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking
vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is
occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the
purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility,
vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or to
secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(b) (2006). "The former version of 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b)
required an officer to have 'articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of
[the Vehicle Code]' to effectuate a vehicle stop." Chase, 960 A.2d at 112. The
modification took effect on February 1, 2004. Id.
80. Reasonable suspicion is a "reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot" based
on "specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in
light of the officer's experience." Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa. 1999)
(citing Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. 1996) and Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. 1997)).
81. Chase, 960 A.2d 108. Before the Pennsylvania legislature modified the statute,
Pennsylvania courts had interpreted the statute's previous ambiguous language to require
police officers to have probable cause before stopping a vehicle. See id at 112; see also
Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983,986 (Pa. 2001).
82. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
83. "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed." Commonwealth v. Gibson, 638 A.2d 203, 206
(Pa. 1994) (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967)).
84. Chase, 960 A.2d at 120.
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The court held that "vehicle stops that are constitutional under Terry v.
Ohio85 are constitutional under article I, section 8.,,86
Further, the court in Chase emphasized that the purpose of a stop
based upon the less stringent standard of reasonable suspicion is to
"allow immediate investigation through temporarily maintaining the
status quo.'87  To ensure that such a stop will serve its goal, the
18
underlying offense must be one that is capable of further investigation.
Thus, in practice, police officers should apply two different standards to
determine whether they have the constitutional authority to stop a
vehicle.89  For offenses where "a post-stop investigation is normally
feasible," such as driving under the influence of alcohol, police may use
the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion. 90  However, where the
offense is not "investigatory," such as in the case of speeding or failing
to obey a traffic signal, the purposes of a Terry stop cannot be achieved,
and an officer must have probable cause to make the vehicle stop
constitutional. 9
Additionally, even when an offense is capable of further
investigation pursuant to a vehicle stop, courts often construe reasonable
suspicion narrowly.92  For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recently held that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a
vehicle based on a violation of section 4524(c) of the Vehicle Code,
93
which proscribes individuals from hanging items from their rearview
mirror that "materially impair[s] the driver's vision through the front
windshield., 94 At the suppression hearing for drugs found pursuant to
the stop, the officer did not articulate with sufficient specificity why he
believed an object hanging from the rearview mirror was obstructing the
85. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a brief interference with an
individual's freedom of movement is justified if an officer has reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot).
86. Chase, 960 A.2d at 117. See also id. at 117-18 (rejecting the defendant's
reliance on Pennsylvania cases finding that probable cause was necessary to stop a driver
who is in violation of the vehicle because the cases interpreted Pennsylvania statutes in
the context of the Fourth Amendment and did not mention article I, section 8).
87. Chase, 960 A.2d at 114-15.
88. Id. at 115-16.
89. See id. at 116.
90. id. at 116.
91. Id. at 116. In an effort to minimize the potential detriment to privacy when cell
phones are involved in investigatory stops, proposed legislation in the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives prohibits officers who are conducting such stops from using
"data extraction device[s] to secure information" from a driver's phone or other
electronic device. H. Rep. 1607, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); see also
infra Part III.B. 1.
92. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89 (Pa. 2011).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 91; 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4524(c) (2006).
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driver's view.95  The court emphasized that the transcript from the
suppression hearing indicated that the officer did not testify "as to the
size or general description of the objects hanging from the rearview
mirror, or how the objects impaired [the driver's] view. 9 6
2. Search Pursuant to a Vehicle Stop: Warrant Requirement and
Exceptions
Although neither the language of article I, section 8 nor the Fourth
Amendment expressly require that a warrant be issued before a search or
an arrest is made, 97 both the United States and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Courts recognize a warrant requirement. 9  However, while the United
States Supreme Court has continuously eroded a defendant's right to
exclude evidence based on the absence of a warrant or on a faulty
warrant,99 case law interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution "has more
consistently adhered to the warrant/probable cause model." 100
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has demonstrated its faithfulness
to the warrant requirement through its treatment of vehicle searches. The
court has rejected arguments in favor of the vehicle exception to the
warrant requirement espoused by the United States Supreme Court.'
01
For instance, in Commonwealth v. White,'0 2 the court dismissed the
rationale that the mobility and lessened expectation of privacy in a
vehicle authorize an exception to the warrant requirement under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.1° 3 Absent special circumstances, such as a
demonstrated threat to public safety, both probable cause and a search
warrant are necessary to search a vehicle.'
0 4
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused to
exempt officers from obtaining a warrant after a police canine alerts for
drugs on an individual's "person."' 0 5  Rejecting the reasoning of the
95. Holmes, 14 A.3d at 97-98.
96. Id. at 98.
97. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The two conjunctive clauses
contained in both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 are not connected.
"[T]he first observes the right of the people against 'unreasonable' searches and seizures,
and the second provides the conditions under which a warrant may issue, including
probable cause and particularity of description." RuDovsKY, supra note 63, at 11.
98. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 902 (1984); see also Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
100. RUDOVSKY, supra note 63, at 12-13.
101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 902.
104. Id.
105. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993).
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United States Supreme Court in United States v. Place,10 6 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Martin,107 held that
use of a drug-sniffing dog to detect whether narcotics were present in an
individual's satchel constituted a search under article I, section 8.108 The
court assumed that the satchel must be afforded greater privacy
protection because it is part of one's person and not merely property, yet
the Martin court failed to offer significant discussion regarding this
meaningful distinction.
10 9
The court also found that to make a sniff search of a person proper,
an officer "must have probable cause to believe that a canine search of a
person will produce contraband or evidence of a crime."' 10 Once a dog
conducts a sniff search of the suspect's person, police must procure a
warrant to search further, unless police are performing a Terry search,
which consists only of patting down the outer garments of the suspect for
weapons."l ' The court explained its divergence from federal precedent
by asserting that "[t]he Constitution does not cease to exist merely
because the government's interest is compelling."
' 12
3. Warrantless Arrests for Misdemeanor or Summary Offenses
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar warrantless arrests in public for minor traffic
offenses when an officer has probable cause to arrest the driver.113
Under Pennsylvania constitutional and statutory law, the issue of
warrantless arrests for minor crimes is less clear. In Commonwealth v.
Clark"14 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a warrantless arrest
in public may be effectuated under two circumstances." 5 Officers may
make a warrantless arrest when they have probable cause to believe that
a particular person has committed a felony.'1 6 Additionally, an officer
may make a public arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant if an
106. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
107. Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993).
108. Id. at 559.
109. Id. at 560 (finding that "different interests are implicated" in a search of one's
person rather than one's property since "an invasion of one's person is, in the usual case,
a more severe intrusion on one's privacy interest than an invasion of one's property"). In
order to conduct a dog sniff search of property, an officer must possess only reasonable
suspicion. Id. at 559.
110. Id. at 559.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 561.
113. See Atwater v. City of Luego Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2004).
114. Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999).
115. Id. at 1251.
116. Id.
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individual commits an offense in the officer's presence. 1 7 In most other
instances, an officer must have a warrant." 
8
Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, an officer
may arrest an individual without a warrant for committing a summary
offense in "exceptional circumstances" if the officer is authorized to do
so by law."l9 In contrast, the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code authorizes "a
member of the Pennsylvania State Police who is in uniform" to "arrest
without a warrant any person who violates any provision of [the Vehicle
Code] in the presence of the police officer making the arrest."'
120
However, when a law enforcement officer who is not a member of the
Pennsylvania State Police observes a violation of the Vehicle Code, the
officer may only effectuate an arrest if the individual is not a
Pennsylvania resident.'21
4. Search Incident to Arrest
Once police officers make a lawful custodial arrest, 22 they may
conduct a full search of the suspect. 123 Pennsylvania courts have not
definitively decided whether a cell phone search is constitutionally
permissible during a search incident to arrest.12 4  Similar contexts,
however, provide guidance as to how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
may rule on the issue. For instance, the court has largely rejected a
vehicle search incident to arrest, stating that "a police officer may search
the arrestee's person and the area in which the person is detained," not
the vehicle. 125 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Timko, 26 the court held,
117. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Long, 414 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1980)).
118. See Clark, 735 A.2d at 1251-52. But see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(a) (2006)
(authorizing warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases "although the offense did not
take place in the presence of the police officer" where the officer has "first observ[ed]
recent physical injury to the victim or other corroborative evidence"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3904 (2006) (authorizing warrantless arrests "for any grade of theft").
119. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 440 cmt. (emphasizing that such an arrest should be reserved
for scenarios "such as those involving violence, or the imminent threat of violence, or
those involving a danger that the defendant will flee").
120. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6304(a) (2006).
121. Id. § 6304(b).
122. An arrest is "any act that indicates an intention to take the person into custody
and subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest."
Commonwealth v. White 669 A.2d 896, 901 (Pa. 1995) (citing Commonwealth v.
Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992)).
123. Clark, 735 A.2dat 1251.
124. While many Pennsylvania cases mention mobile phones in the context of the
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, a thorough search of
case law did not reveal any results directly bearing on the propriety of warrantless
searches of data contained in a mobile phone under article I, section 8.
125. See Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995). There is an
exception to the general rule that vehicle searches incident to arrest are not permissible.
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in part, that an arrestee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
"zippered valise" taken from a vehicle. Because the valise was
comparable to "personal luggage," police were required to secure a
warrant before searching its contents.127 Additionally, because arrests for
ordinary traffic offenses usually do not generate evidence that police can
seize, officers must possess "independent probable cause to believe a
felony has been committed"'' 28 and must believe that weapons or
evidence of the felony can be found in a vehicle before they can legally
search it.
129
5. Cell Phone Search and Seizure
Pennsylvania case law related to searches of cell phones, incident to
arrest or otherwise, is scant. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has yet to resolve many issues, prior decisions indicate that Pennsylvania
courts are sensitive to the unique privacy risks created by cell phone
searches.130  For instance, in Commonwealth v. Cruttenden,'3 1 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court decided that warrantless interception of text
messages violated the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act. 132 In the area of cell phone searches incident to arrest,
federal courts have produced some case law on the topic. One of the
most influential cases is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Finley.33 Although the court held that an
individual had a privacy interest in his cell phone, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that his cell phone was analogous to a closed
container apart from his person. 134 Instead, the Finley court found that
the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest under the Fourth
Amendment extended to containers found on the person of the
arrestee.135
Id. at 902 n.5. The exception applies when the police need to search a vehicle to "avoid
danger to themselves or others," such as when explosives may be found. Id.
126. Commonwealth v. Timko, 417 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1980).
127. Id. at 623.
128. Commonwealth v. Dussel, 266 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1970).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 976 A.2d 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
131. Id. at 1179 ("Because the Wiretap Act emphasizes the constitutional protection
of privacy, its provisions are strictly construed.").
132. Id. at 1181 (finding that the texts in this case constituted electronic
communications within the meaning of the Act because the officer received the text
messages contemporaneously with their transmission); Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5701-82 (2006).
133. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
134. Id. at 260.
135. Id.
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More recently, in United States v. Flores-Lopez,136 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a search of a cell phone
incident to arrest was permissible where it was limited to identifying the
telephone number associated with the phone. 37 Although officers used
the telephone number to obtain the defendant's call records from the
telephone company 138 and the court emphasized that "[t]he potential
invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search
of a 'container' in a conventional sense,"' 139 the Court of Appeals found
the search in this case to be too trivial an intrusion to arouse significant
privacy concerns. 40 Based on Pennsylvania courts' historic independent
interpretation of article I, section 8, the state courts are free to rule on cell
phone search incident to arrest issues in a way that is consistent with
Pennsylvania precedent. 141
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA TEXTING BAN UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 8
A. Enforcement: The Initial Traffic Stop and the Problem of Proof
One potentially concerning aspect of Pennsylvania's legislation
banning text messaging while driving is enforcement of the provision.
As an offense subject to primary enforcement, 142 section 3316 allows law
enforcement officers to stop any driver that they observe using a cell
phone for "text-based communication. '143 Because the law deliberately
does not proscribe a driver's use of an "interactive wireless
communications device" to place, receive, or engage in a phone call,'
44
an officer must differentiate between actions that often appear similar.
Consequently, it is unlikely that officers will consistently be able to
perceive whether drivers are using cell phones legally, which may lead to
inaccurate or diminished enforcement.
136. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).
137. Id. at 810.
138. Id. at 804.
139. Id. at 805.
140. Id. at 806-07, 810.
141. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993). But cf Rudovsky,
supra note 66 (discussing the current developments in state jurisprudence and stating that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been following, and may continue to follow, federal
Fourth Amendment precedent rather than afford Pennsylvanians greater search and
seizure rights under article I, section 8).
142. See HANDS-FREE INFO, supra note 32.
143. 75 PA. CONS. STAT § 3316(a) (Supp. 2012).
144. Id. ("A person does not send, read or write a text-based communication when
the person reads, selects or enters a telephone number or name in an interactive wireless
communications device for the purpose of activating or deactivating a voice
communication or a telephone call.").
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Officers also have little guidance in determining the nature and
amount of proof required to stop a vehicle for a violation of section
3316.145 The Pennsylvania General Assembly and the state supreme
court have articulated that police must possess reasonable suspicion to
detain the occupants of a vehicle briefly. 146  Reasonable suspicion
requires that officers be able to "point to 'specific and articulable facts'
leading [them] to suspect" a violation of the Vehicle Code. 47
Nonetheless, the rationale underlying a Terry stop based upon
reasonable suspicion only applies to offenses that are "investigatory" in
nature.14 8  Under the framework articulated in Commonwealth v.
Chase,149 a vehicle stop that is "investigatory"' 5 ° requires an officer to
have reasonable suspicion. 5  Although an officer may stop an
automobile upon reasonable suspicion, the officer must establish
probable cause that the driver violated the Vehicle Code to issue a
citation or to detain the driver longer than necessary.' 52 A finding of
probable cause must occur during the brief time in which an officer is
permitted to detain an individual for an investigatory stop.'53 On the
other hand, if an offense is not "investigatory," an officer must have
probable cause because, as a practical matter, the officer cannot gather
additional evidence related to the offense during the stop.'
5 4
Sending a "text-based communication"'55 from a mobile phone
appears to be an inherently investigatory offense. Because vehicles
move at a high speed, officers may have difficulty determining whether
145. Because Pennsylvania's on texting while driving has gone into effect recently, its
practical application is somewhat uncertain. However, one can make analogies to other
offenses regarding the proof that an officer must articulate to constitutionally stop a
vehicle for using a cell phone to text or e-mail.
146. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(b); Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa.
2008).
147. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. 1996)).
148. Chase, 960 A.2d at 115.
149. Id. at 116.
150. "Investigatory" offenses, such as driving under the influence of alcohol, require
further inquiry by a law enforcement officer to establish whether the individual being
stopped has committed the requisite elements of the offense. Id.; see also supra Part
II.C.1.
151. Chase, 960A.2dat 116.
152. See Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) ("An
investigative detention may last 'as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion."'
(quoting Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 A.2d 495, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004))).
153. See id.
154. Id. But see Chase, 960 A.2d at 121 (Saylor, J., concurring) (arguing that
stopping a driver for a non-investigatory traffic offense such as "driving at an unsafe
speed, running a red light, and driving the wrong way on a one-way street" often results
in the driver "mak[ing] an inculpatory statement to the officer following the stop").
155. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(f).
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drivers are using their cell phones for permissible purposes.
Accordingly, some form of investigation will often be necessary for
officers to confirm their original suspicions. It appears especially likely
that a violation of section 3316 is an offense for which further
investigation would be necessary when text messaging while driving is
compared to driving under the influence, 156 which the Chase court
characterized as an investigatory offense. 157 In both offenses, officers
usually cannot accurately conclude whether a violation occurred without
stopping the vehicle. 158 Additionally, like driving under the influence of
alcohol, evidence of texting while driving is contained within the vehicle.
Even so, courts may plausibly characterize a perceived violation of
section 3316 as an offense for which officers cannot gain additional
evidence from a post-stop investigation. In that case, an officer should
have probable cause before stopping the vehicle to issue a citation.
159
The ban states that it "shall not be construed as authorizing the seizure or
forfeiture of [a cell phone], unless otherwise provided by law."'
160
Consequently, if a cell phone is not subject to "seizure" by a police
officer, the only investigation that could ensue after a stop-assuming
the driver does not consent to a cell phone search-would be questioning
the driver on the purpose of his or her cell phone use. Such an
"investigation" is of the same type that could follow common non-
investigatory offenses, such as speeding or failing to obey a traffic
signal. 16 1 Similarly, like many non-investigatory offenses, 162 the texting
prohibition is a summary offense with a small fine. 163  As such,
Pennsylvania courts may not view an intrusion into a phone's call or text
messaging history as constitutionally permissible in light of an
individual's significant privacy rights.1
64
Because of the unique privacy intrusions associated with its
communicative nature, 65 a violation of section 3316 does not fit neatly
156. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802 (2006).
157. Chase, 960 A.2d at 116.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316 (Supp. 2012).
161. Cf Chase, 960 A.2d at 115.
162. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3323 (2006) (failing to obey stop signs and yield
signs is a summary offense); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3362 (2006) (stating that the penalty
for exceeding the maximum speed limit is "$42.50 for violating a maximum speed limit
of 65 miles per hour" and that violation is a summary offense); 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3342(a), (f) (2006) (providing that failing to stop a vehicle at a railroad crossing is a
summary offense subject to a $100 to $150 fine).
163. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(d).
164. See cases cited supra note 76.
165. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Even the
dumbest of modem cell phones gives the user access to large stores of information.");
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into the same category as driving under the influence of alcohol.
Nevertheless, because determining whether a driver has sent or received
text-based communications while driving is inherently ascertainable, it is
not sufficiently analogous to most minor traffic offenses to warrant a
conclusion that investigation is not possible following a stop.
166
Consequently, officers will likely be able to stop a vehicle if they have
reasonable suspicion that an individual has been using an "interactive
wireless communications device" to engage in "text-based
communication" while driving.
167
Additional considerations arise if one assumes that officers may
make vehicle stops predicated on reasonable suspicion. Like the court in
Commonwealth v. Holmes,168 Pennsylvania courts must determine what
observations by a police officer warrant a determination sufficient to
support reasonable suspicion for a violation of section 3316.169 In
Holmes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a testifying officer
did not describe an item dangling from a rearview window with
sufficient specificity to support the officer's conclusion that the item
"materially obstructed" the driver's view.' As a result, the court
concluded that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle. 171 Holmes illustrates the importance of an officer's ability to
articulate reasonable suspicion for stopping a driver for even seemingly
minor violations of the Vehicle Code. 172 The standard for stopping a
vehicle becomes especially important when the stop uncovers evidence
that implicates an individual of a more serious crime, such as drug
possession. 173 Because the exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence
gathered unlawfully, stops are often the subject of scrutiny during
suppression hearings. 1
74
Officers applying the law and courts reviewing the constitutionality
of law enforcement actions must determine which observations will
Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 976 A.2d 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009); see also infra note
183.
166. Compare 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316 (supp. 2012), with, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3301 (Supp. 2012).
167. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316 (supp. 2012).
168. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89 (Pa. 2011); see also supra pp. 22-23.
169. See§ 3316.
170. Holmes, 14 A.3d at 98.
171. Id. at 99.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1250-51 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2008) (affirming the validity of a traffic stop for violation of a prohibition of tinted
windows that eventually led to the discovery of drugs).
174. See generally Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89 (Pa. 2011) (excluding the
use of drugs and paraphernalia at trial because there was no reasonable suspicion to
support the vehicle stop that led to the discovery of items).
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allow an officer to articulate reasonable suspicion to stop a driver based
on section 3316. Several observations could possibly constitute
sufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion that a driver is
sending or receiving "a text message, instant message, electronic mail or
other written communication."'' 75 For instance, officers could articulate
that they witnessed drivers taking their eyes off the road to view a screen
or taking a hand or hands off the steering wheel to enter data into the
device. Because section 3316 is a primary offense, an adverse effect on
an offender's driving abilities is not required to stop a driver;176 however,
a driver's actions, such as swerving or slowed reaction times, may
strengthen an argument that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop
the vehicle.
Several additional enforcement considerations arise if courts
characterize text messaging while driving as an investigatory offense
requiring reasonable suspicion to stop a driver for investigatory
purposes. 177 These issues relate to an officer's ability to pursue evidence
of the offense. Although an officer always needs probable cause to issue
a valid citation, an officer can establish probable cause through the
subsequent stop when the offense is investigatory. 178  This standard
greatly expands an officer's ability to pursue evidence of text messaging
while driving. 179
Consequently, if the offense is investigatory, an officer will be more
likely to view a phone's texting or call history. Aside from questioning
the driver in hopes of a truthful answer, there are few methods by which
an officer can determine if a driver had been texting or making a phone
call.' 80 Unlike conducting a field sobriety test in the case of driving
while intoxicated,' 8' or inspecting an item hanging from a rearview
mirror to determine whether it "materially obstructs" a driver's vision,'
82
inspecting a driver's cell phone implicates privacy interests in an
individual's communications. 183  Pennsylvania courts are immediately
suspicious of any interference with an individual's "right to privacy.
', 84
175. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(f).
176. Id. § 3316(a).
177. See Chase, 960 A.2d at 116; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 1 (1968).
178. See generally Chase, 960 A.2d 108. In contrast, an officer must have probable
cause before stopping a driver for a "non-investigatory" offense. See id. at 115-16.
179. Seeid at 115-16.
180. Justice Saylor wrote a concurring opinion in Chase arguing that the ability to
question a driver about the driver's conduct makes every violation of the Vehicle Code
investigatory. Id at 121 (Saylor, J., concurring).
181. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802 (2006).
182. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 98 (Pa. 2011).
183. A potentially problematic aspect of enforcing section 3316 as an investigatory
offense relates to its overlap with the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic
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Problems may also arise, however, if texting while driving is a non-
investigatory offense. An officer's inability to conduct an adequate
investigation might lead to sanctions even when the driver was using his
or her phone for a permissible purpose. Additionally, while refraining
from investigating a violation of section 3316 may more adequately
protect a driver's privacy interests, such action could make enforcement
of the prohibition excessively burdensome. This burden could lead to
less motivation for officers to enforce the law. Scattered enforcement
may decrease the deterrent effect of the law and lessen its impact on
decreasing the number of collisions on state roads.
A partial solution to the problem of proof is for the Pennsylvania
General Assembly to pass legislation banning all cell phone use by
drivers-except those using a hands-free device-as several other states
have done. 185 However, to those who view personal responsibility rather
than state intervention as the solution to distracted driving, added
prohibitions may not be popular. 86  Moreover, considering that the
Pennsylvania General Assembly was in gridlock for several years before
it enacted the current ban, 187 a more comprehensive resolution is not
likely to pass in the near future.
Solutions to the problems of enforcing Pennsylvania's new
distracted driving law must balance public safety on the road with
drivers' privacy interests in the information stored in their phones.
While a law enforcement officer may often need to investigate the reason
for which a driver was using a phone, the officer should first seek to gain
Surveillance Control Act. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5701-82. (2006). Under that scheme of
legislation, warrantless interception of "wire, electronic, and oral communications" is
prohibited. Id § 5703. While "text messages do constitute electronic communications as
statutorily defined[,]" Commonwealth v. Cruttenden, 976 A.2d 1176, 1181, n.5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2009), a violation of the Act requires that interception of such data be
"contemporaneous with [its] transmission," Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823,
829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). Hence, an officer violating the Act in the context of section
3316 must have possession of the wireless phone and "intercept" incoming messages or
calls. See Cruttenden, 976 A.2d at 1181.
184. See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 21 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)
("Because the protections of the Wiretap Act emanate from the speaker's right to privacy,
all of the Act's provisions [allowing officers to interfere with privacy rights] are to be
strictly construed.").
185. Ten states and the District of Columbia have banned all cell phone use while
driving: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia. See Cell Phone and Texting Laws, supra note
21; see also supra note 22.
186. See generally Harvard Men's Health Watch, Harvard Report. Rise in Distracted
Driving Fatalities Correlates with Increase in Mobile Devices, THE ALTERNATIVE DAILY
(June 8, 2012), http://bit.ly/MhXhsv ("In the last analysis, personal responsibility is the
only way to contain the problem.").
187. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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an admission from the driver. If the driver does not admit to texting
while driving and asserts that his or her use of the phone was for the
purpose of placing or ending a phone call, the officer should seek the
driver's consent to view the phone's most recent call history.'88
Examining a driver's text or call history should constitute a search under
article I, section 8.189 As such, police should avoid a warrantless search
of a driver's mobile phone, if possible, to ensure that citations are
enforceable in court and that individual privacy interests remain intact.
B. Search and Seizure Implications
1. Search after Vehicle Stop
The previously stated enforcement concerns generate several search
and seizure questions that remain unanswered by both the legislature and
the courts. Although the Pennsylvania law proscribing text-based
communication while driving contains a provision stating that the
prohibition "shall not be construed as authorizing the seizure or forfeiture
of an interactive wireless communications device, unless otherwise
provided by law,"' 90 this language is unlikely to fully protect drivers
from potentially unconstitutional searches. The provision mentions
seizures only-not searches-and states that seizure or forfeiture may be
appropriate when "otherwise provided by law."'19' Because of the
previously stated enforcement concerns, officers may view a search, with
or without consent, as necessary to investigate whether a driver was
using a phone for an impermissible purpose.
192
To safeguard citizens' privacy rights in their communications when
stopped for a violation of the Vehicle Code, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly has proposed an amendment 93 to the Pennsylvania statute
governing reasonable suspicion and searches. 194  The proposed
legislation amends a statute that currently allows officers who have
reasonable suspicion "to secure... information as the officer may
188. The acceptable legal scope of consent searches and problems of coercion relating
to such searches are beyond the purview of this Comment. For a discussion of consent to
search following a vehicle stop, see RUDOVSKY, supra note 63, at 83-85.
189. See PA. CONST. art I, § 8; see also RUDOVSKY, supra note 63, at 14-19 (providing
an overview of cases in which Pennsylvania courts have held that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution).
190. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(c) (2012).
191. Id. As previously discussed in Part I1.B.2.b, a seizure or forfeiture "otherwise
provided by law" may include a seizure following arrest.
192. See supra pp. 31-32.
193. H.R. 1607, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011).
194. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(b) (2006).
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reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this
title." 1 95 The proposed amendment provides that "no police officer who
stops a vehicle in accordance with paragraph (1) may use a data
extraction device to secure information from an electronic device in the
possession of the driver or passenger in the vehicle."'' 96 The proposed
amendment could potentially function as a safeguard to drivers' privacy
rights in their cell phones, but it has not been passed by the Pennsylvania
General Assembly.
2. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
a. Warrantless Arrests for Misdemeanors or Summary Offenses
Pennsylvania case law interpreting article I, section 8 suggests that
an officer may arrest an individual if the officer witnesses a violation of
the Vehicle Code, even if the offense does not rise to the level of a
felony. 97 Under current statutory1 98 and case law, 199 any police officer
may make a warrantless arrest of a nonresident driver for use of a cell
phone for written communication if the use occurred in the presence of
the officer.200 However, only uniformed members of the Pennsylvania
201State Police may arrest residents of the state for the same offense.
Because violating the Pennsylvania statute is a primary offense, 202 a
custodial arrest based solely on texting while driving is, in fact, lawful
under certain circumstances.20 3 Although an arrest under this provision,
195. Id.
196. H.R. 1607, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011) (The proposed
amendment goes on to define "data extraction device" as "a tool used to extract data
stored in a telecommunications device, including, but not limited to, the following data:
call history, text messages, contacts, images, videos, geotags, voice mails, voice
recordings, source messaging service (SMS) messages, multi-media messaging service
(MMS) messages or subscriber identification module (SIM) data.").
197. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999).
198. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6304(a) (2006) ("A member of the Pennsylvania State
Police who is in uniform may arrest without a warrant any person who violates any
provision of this title in the presence of the police officer making the arrest.").
199. See Hughes v. Shestakov, No. CIV.A.00-6054, 2002 WL 1742666 (E.D. Pa.
2002). The Hughes court noted that Pennsylvania law is ambiguous regarding
warrantless arrests of individuals for misdemeanors when the officer has probable cause,
but the offense is not committed in the presence of an officer; the court also stated that
"the contours of the right" are not "sufficiently clear such that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at *4. Therefore, the court held
that the officer has qualified immunity from a false arrest claim under Pennsylvania law.
Id.
200. See supra note 193.
201. See § 6304(b).
202. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316 (Supp. 2012).
203. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6304(a) (2006).
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alone, is not likely to occur frequently because the penalty is minor, such
an arrest raises concerns that the search incident to arrest doctrine
authorizes a warrantless search of a driver's cell phone.2 °4
b. Scope of Search Incident to Arrest
As an exception to the general search warrant requirement, the
search incident to arrest doctrine allows an officer to search the person of
an individual that he or she has lawfully arrested. 20 5 The rationale for
this rule is to ensure that there are no weapons within the reach of the
arrestee and that officers are able to save evidence from destruction.20 6
Treatment of cell phone searches incident to arrest under article I, section
8 can be analogized to other situations in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has applied this doctrine.20 7
A Pennsylvania court undertaking this analysis must begin by
asking whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the data stored on a cell phone.2 °8 It is sensible that an individual would
have an expectation of privacy that society accepts as reasonable in a cell
phone because of the personal nature of a phone and the breadth of
information stored on such a device.20 9  However, an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy only gives him or her standing to
204. A search of an arrestee's cell phone incident to arrest was found to be
permissible in United States v. Finley. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir.
2007).
205. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
206. Id. at 762-63; Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, 130 (Pa. 1995) (citing
Commonwealth v. Timko, 417 A.2d 620, 622 (Pa. 1980)) (stating that a search incident
to arrest is limited "to areas and clothing immediately accessible to the person arrested"
and that "the purpose of this search is to prevent the arrestee from securing weapons or
destroying contraband").
207. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Timko, 417 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Dussel, 439 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1970).
208. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that there is no
"search" under the Fourth Amendment if an individual does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a communication).
209. Pennsylvania has comprehensive case law on the issue of an individual's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in various contexts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993) (holding that an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in personal possessions and an officer must possess probable cause before
conducting a dog sniff search of a satchel in the suspect's possession); Commonwealth v.
Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254, 1258 (Pa. 1989) ("[A] pen register cannot be utilized by law
enforcement authorities without an order based on probable cause."); Commonwealth v.
Dejohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979) (holding that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in bank records). Cf Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa.
1983) (holding that, in contrast to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), an individual charged with a possessory offense has
standing to challenge the search as a matter of course under the Pennsylvania
Constitution).
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object to the search; it does not address whether that search is
reasonable.21°
The next portion of the court's analysis should turn upon whether
the court considers a cell phone as part of an arrestee's person or as part
of the person's separate "luggage." Consistent with precedent and the
spirit of Pennsylvania search and seizure law,211 the state supreme court
should decide whether to diverge from standards used by some federal
courts in interpreting the Fourth Amendment.212 In determining whether
to follow current Pennsylvania jurisprudence, or embark on a new
precedent, following federal law, the court should consider the four
Edmunds factors.213
A unique situation arises if police officers arrest a driver pursuant to
section 3316 and the contents of the driver's cell phone were searched
incident to arrest. Unlike an ordinary traffic offense, both the vehicle
and the cell phone are instrumentalities involved in the commission of
the offense.214 In the vehicle context, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has established that, barring exigent circumstances, "the arrestee's
privacy interests remain intact as against a warrantless search" of a
vehicle.21 5 Conversely, an individual's "person and the immediate area
which the person occupies" is searchable incident to arrest to facilitate
216the objectives of the doctrine.
Courts may perceive a cell phone as analogous to the satchel that
211was sniff-searched in Commonwealth v. Martin. While the Martin
court was protective of citizen privacy rights in that case,218 the
assumption that a satchel is part of an individual's "person" is
problematic when applied in the search incident to arrest framework
because items that are considered part of the "person" are searchable
following a valid arrest. 21 9 A possibility exists that the Pennsylvania
210. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
211. See supra Part II.C.
212. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
213. See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
214. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(a) (Supp. 2012) ("No driver shall operate a
motor vehicle.., while using a [mobile phone] to send, read or write a text-based
communication while the vehicle is in motion." (emphasis added)).
215. Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995). The court in White also
stated that "[m]erely arresting someone does not give police carte blanche to search any
property belonging to the arrestee." Id. (emphasis in original). Along the same lines,
without independent probable cause of another offense, it is unlawful for police to
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile that they stop for a routine violation of the
Vehicle Code. See Commonwealth v. Dussell, 266 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1970).
216. White, 669 A.2d at 902.
217. Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993).
218. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
219. White, 669 A.2d at 902.
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Supreme Court, like the Fifth Circuit in Finley, will find that a mobile
phone is analogous to a satchel or other container based on the reasoning
in Martin.22 °
The fear that Pennsylvania courts will treat cell phones as objects
searchable incident to arrest is partially alleviated by a close reading of
Commonwealth v. Timko.221  Timko articulates that, unlike vehicles
which are "inherent[ly] mobil[e,]" luggage "is not mobile once it is taken
into police custody. 222  As such, the primary rationale supporting a
Fourth Amendment vehicle search incident to arrest is not applicable to
items such as the "zippered valise" in Timko.223 Thus, officers must
obtain a warrant to search items in vehicles that are analogous to
luggage.224 Similar reasoning applies to cell phones. Once police stop
the vehicle and take the wireless device into custody, the rationale
underlying a search incident to arrest 225 disappears. An arrestee cannot
use the automobile or the cell phone as a weapon, nor can he or she
destroy evidence of an offense under section 3316 while the device is in
the possession of an officer.2 26 As such, an officer should be required to
obtain a warrant to conduct a search pursuant to article I, section 8.227
Considering the significance of the warrant requirement in search
and seizure jurisprudence, any exception reducing the authority of this
restraint on government power must be "narrowly construed.,
228
Additionally, because "case law in Pennsylvania [has] historically taken
a more narrow view of the search incident to arrest exception than the
federal courts, 229 state courts should appropriately limit erosion of the
warrant requirement under article I, section 8. The enactment of
Pennsylvania's text messaging ban creates additional opportunity for the
judicial system to further depreciate the warrant requirement in the
context of search incident to arrest. Thus, Pennsylvania courts reviewing
case law on the issue should recognize that searching a cell phone
following an arrest for a violation of section 3316 does not serve the
purposes of the search incident to arrest doctrine.
220. See Martin, 626 A.2d at 142-43.
221. Commonwealth v. Timko, 417 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1980).
222. Id. at 623.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
226. But see United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807-09 (7th Cir. 2012)
(describing the danger of "remote wiping" in which co-conspirators monitoring a phone
from afar are alerted to its seizure and wipe the phone of its contents).
227. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
228. Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa. 1995) (citing New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting)).
229. Shiflet, 670 A.2d at 129.
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IV. CONCLUSION
By enacting section 3316, Pennsylvania lawmakers have taken a
significant step toward discouraging the use of hand-held cell phones
while driving.230  However, as motorists find more creative ways of
driving while distracted, policymakers must strongly advance the
important policy objective of safety on Pennsylvania roadways.
Although zealously enforcing the state's law prohibiting a driver from
"send[ing], read[ing,] or writ[ing] a text-based communication"23' while
driving is critical to public safety, the government must tread lightly to
prevent erosion of the privacy rights of its citizens.232
The passage of Pennsylvania Vehicle Code section 3316 raises
several issues concerning the proper approach that both law enforcement
officers and courts should take in fitting this law into the state
constitutional scheme. To safeguard the privacy rights of drivers,
officers must recognize that section 3316 will be difficult to enforce.233
Courts, therefore, must clarify the level of suspicion and articulable facts
necessary to stop a vehicle under the provision, keeping in mind the
often-competing interests of individual privacy and public safety.
Officers must be sensitive to drivers' privacy expectations in the
information stored in their cell phones. Officers should secure a warrant
to search a mobile phone following arrest of an individual because the
rationale behind the search incident to arrest doctrine is not applicable to
such devices.23 4 Legislators, law enforcement personnel, and citizens
must identify possible ramifications and must consider how cell phone
use while driving fits into the current constitutional stop, search, and
seizure framework. In doing so, those individuals should continue to
acknowledge that Pennsylvania is a state where "an individual's privacy
interests are given greater deference than under federal law.
2 35
Despite possible difficulty in enforcing the ban on text-based
communication while driving, the legislation is symbolic of the General
Assembly's commitment to safety on Pennsylvania roads. As such, the
law and the policies it reflects demonstrate the government's desire to
alter societal norms through legislation proscribing a practice that is as
dangerous as driving under the influence of alcohol.236 Although section
3316 could better protect the privacy interests of Pennsylvania residents,
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3316(a) (Supp. 2012).
232. See cases cited supra note 76.
233. See supra Part III.A.
234. See discussion supra Parts II.C.4, III.B.2.b.
235. Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995).
236. See sources cited supra note 14.
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it marks an important step in altering unsafe driving behaviors and is
likely to have a deterrent effect on individuals who consider whether to
send or read text-messages while driving.
